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HEIGHTENED IMMUNITY FOR COMPARATIVE
ADVERTISING SPEECH: A RESPONSE TO U.S.
HEAL THCARE
The United States Supreme Court has departed from the Court's tra-
ditional First Amendment analysis in defamation cases by forming the
commercial speech doctrine.' Although declining to extend full, or height-
ened, protection to commercial speech, the Court has granted commercial
speech limited First Amendment protection. 2 However, the Court has not
addressed the issue of First Amendment protection in the context of com-
parative advertising. While comparative advertising retains some of the
factors of traditional commercial speech, comparative advertising presents
a unique situation in that two advertisers rather than one are presenting
their products to the public. Therefore, the Court should re-examine the
level of First Amendment protection that the Court affords comparative
advertising speech.
3
However, the Court need not reject its commercial speech doctrine for
noncomparative advertising 4 but, 'rather, should carve out an exception for
comparative advertising.5 In making this exception, the Court should adopt
a three-pronged test to determine whether an advertiser's speech should
receive heightened First Amendment protection.6 Under the first prong of
the proposed test, both competitors in the advertising campaign must have
equal access to the media.7 Next, the advertisers must direct the advertise-
ments at specific products offered by the competitor.8 Finally, the court
should apply this test only to statements made in a commercial setting.9
1. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1984)
(holding that First Amendment provides limited protection for commercial speech); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (restating that commercial speech
receives less protection than other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech for first time); see also infra note
30 (defining commercial speech).
2. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (explaining that commercial speech
receives limited First Amendment protection).
3. See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text (explaining how comparative adver-
tising differs from traditional commercial speech).
4. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (discussing proposed three-pronged
test for comparative advertising).
5. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (proposing test for comparative
advertising).
6. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (discussing three-pronged test to
determine whether commercial speech should receive heightened First Amendment protection).
7. See infra notes 179-182 and accompanying text (explaining reasoning behind require-
ment of equal media access).
8. See infra notes 183-185 and accompanying text (explaining requirement that advertiser
direct advertisement at competitor's product).
9. See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text (explaining requirement that statement
be made in commercial setting).
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The Supreme Court grants heightened First Amendment protection'0 to
certain categories of individuals in specific circumstances. In defamation
actions, the Court considers two factors to determine whether to grant
heightened First Amendment protection." First, the Court determines whether
the issue involved is of public concern, 2 or, rather, is a private matter.
3 If
the subject matter of the alleged defamatory statement is of public concern,
the Court insulates the statement with greater First Amendment protection.
4
The policy behind this rule is that the protection of the free exchange of
ideas is a fundamental principle of the constitutional system.15 When the
exchange involves matters that are of particular interest to the general
public, rather than to a limited number of individuals, the Court protects
that speech to avoid a chilling effect on speech from the institution of
defamation actions.16 In upholding the defamation heightened protection
standard for noncommercial speech on matters of public concern in past
10. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (giving for first time
heightened First Amendment protection). Heightened protection means that the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. Id. at 280. The Court defined actual malice
as making a statement with knowledge of the statement's falsity, or with reckless disregard of
whether the statement was true or false. Id.
In New York Times the court considered whether a public official plaintiff could recover
damages for defamatory statements made regarding his official conduct without a showing of
actual malice. Id. at 256. The plaintiff was an elected official in Alabama. Id. The defendant
had published an advertisement that indicated that the police in Alabama had taken unfair
actions against black students. Id. at 256-58. Although the allegedly defamatory statements
never referred to the plaintiff specifically, the plaintiff contended that, because he was
Commissioner of the Police Department, the statements had directly accused him of wrong-
doing. Id. at 258.
The Court denied recovery for the plaintiff on the grounds that under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments a state may not award damages to a public official absent a showing
of actual malice. Id. at 279-80. The Court stated that a fundamental principle of the United
States constitutional system is the free exchange of ideas, particularly when that exchange
would result in political and social changes desired by the people. Id. at 269.
The Court stated that concern for the reputation of public officials does not make speech
that is critical of those officials subject to less First Amendment protection. Id. at 272-73.
The Court further concluded that potential dissemination of false information also is an
insufficient reason for limiting free speech, because some falsity is inevitable in free debate,
and must be tolerated to ensure protection of true statements. Id. at 271.
11. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974) (outlining two
distinctions used in determining whether to grant heightened First Amendment protection in
defamation actions).
12. See id. at 337 (defining issue of public concern). An issue is of public concern if
society at large would be interested in the matter. Id.
13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (defining
private matters). The Court defined private matters as those solely in the individual interest
of the speaker and its specific audience. Id.
14. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 279 (describing chilling effect). The term "chilling effect" refers to instances
in which the fear of a defamation action by the plaintiff silences a speaker. Id. The Court
has granted heightened protection to matters involving public concern to avoid the chilling
effect, thereby encouraging the free exchange of ideas. Id.
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cases, the Court has recognized the inevitability that the Court also will
protect some falsehood. 7 The Supreme Court has reasoned, however, that
the goal of allowing freedom of speech on public issues outweighs the
detrimental effect of insulating some defamatory material. 8
The second factor that the court considers is whether the allegedly
defamed plaintiff is a public figure or a private figure. 9 The Court grants
statements concerning public figures a higher level of protection than
statements concerning private figures. 20 According to the Court, the principle
behind this dichotomy is that those individuals who deliberately have put
themselves in the public eye have greater access to the media than do private
citizens and, therefore, these public figures have a greater opportunity to
correct false statements made about them. 2' Accordingly, in cases involving
public figures, the Court need not intervene to protect the plaintiff, because
the plaintiff can easily rebut the defamatory remark. 22 However, the Court
grants to the private figure plaintiff greater protection from defamatory
statements than to the public figure plaintiff.23 The Court grants more
protection to the private figure plaintiff because the private figure does not
have ready access to the media and, therefore, cannot rebut a defamatory
statement? Accordingly, the Court intervenes to protect the plaintiff in
situations where the plaintiff cannot directly refute the allegedly defamatory
remark. 2 The Supreme Court grants this protection by giving the states the
latitude to define standards of liability in defamation cases involving private
figures. 26 However, the states may not impose liability without fault, nor
17. See id. at 271-72 (explaining likelihood of protecting some falsehood by protecting
matters of public concern).
18. See id. (stating that protection of free speech outweighs occasional protection of
falsehood).
19. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (holding that court
must decide whether plaintiff is public figure, because public figures have less need for
protection from defamatory statements). In Gertz the Court considered whether a publisher
of defamatory falsehoods about a private individual is entitled to heightened protection under
the actual malice standard when the statement is of public concern. Id. at 332. The plaintiff,
an attorney, represented a murder victim's family. Id. The defendant magazine had published
an article which alleged that the murder trial was part of a communist conspiracy to discredit
the local police. Id. at 325-26. The article had further implied that the plaintiff had a criminal
record. Id. at 326.
The Court first recognized that no such thing as a false idea exists under the First
Amendment. Id. at 339. However, the Court reasoned that intentional lies and careless errors
do nothing to advance society's interest in free and robust debate on public issues. Id. at 340.
The Court then distinguished between public and private figures and stated that private figures
have less opportunity to correct false statements made about them. Id. at 344. The state
interest in protecting the reputation of private individuals, therefore, is greater than the First
Amendment protection of speech involving matters of public concern. Id.
20. Id. at 342-43.




25. Id. at 345-46.
26. Id. at 347-48.
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may the states allow punitive damage awards absent a showing of actual
malice. 27 In contrast, in cases involving public figure plaintiffs, the Court
does not allow the states to impose liability absent a showing of actual
malice. 2 This actual malice standard represents the heightened First Amend-
ment protection that courts traditionally afford speech made about public
figures .
29
However, the Supreme Court rejected traditional First Amendment
analysis in forming the commercial speech doctrine. 0 Originally, the Court
denied commercial speech any First Amendment protection." The first case
to address the First Amendment issue in a commercial context was Valentine
v. Chrestensen.12 In Valentine the Court considered whether a municipal
ordinance forbidding distribution of handbills containing commercial ad-
vertising matter was constitutional.3 3 Chrestensen, the plaintiff in the case,
owned a submarine, which he exhibited for profit. 34 Chrestensen distributed
a handbill advertising the submarine and stating the submarine's admission
fee.3 5 Upon learning that the handbill violated the City Code, which forbade
distribution of commercial advertising matter in the streets, Chrestensen
prepared a double-faced handbill. 6 On one side, the new handbill advertised
the submarine, and on the other side protested the City Dock Department's
refusal to allow Chrestensen wharfage facilities at a city pier for the
exhibition of his submarine.3 7 The Police Department warned Chrestensen
27. Id. at 348-49.
28. Id. at 342.
29. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986) (explaining that
speech concerning public figures receives heightened protection); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 156 (1979) (same); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1979) (same);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (same).
30. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1983) (limiting First
Amendment protection in commercial speech context); see also Brannigan & Ensor, -Did Bose
Speak Too Softly?: Product Critiques and the First Amendment, 14 HoFsTPA L. REv. 571,
579-583 (1986) (discussing history of commercial speech doctrine). The Supreme Court has
broadly defined commercial speech as expression related to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience-generally in the form of a commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods and services. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
Brannigan and Ensor argue that the heightened First Amendment protection of the actual
malice standard should extend to product critiques by consumers and consumer organizations.
Brannigan & Ensor, supra, at 588. The authors contend that product critiques, "whether
biased or unbiased, correct or incorrect, are an exposition of ideas and opinions concerning
consumer choice in the marketplace." Id. Following the reasoning of the Virginia Pharmacy
line of cases, the authors contend that criticism in this context is a valuable tool in the
marketplace. Id. The authors liken this type of comparison to political speech. Id.
31. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (denying First Amendment
protection to speech that is commercial in nature).
32. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
33. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
34. Id. at 52.





that the handbill violated the Code and, consequently, when Chrestensen
continued to distribute the handbill, the police arrested him. 8
The district court granted Chrestensen a permanent injunction against
the Police Commissioner to enjoin the police from interfering with Chres-
tensen's distribution. 9 The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's
determination that the streets are a proper place to exercise the freedom of
speech and that the states may regulate the privilege only to the extent
necessary to protect the public interest.4° However, the Court disagreed with
the district court's holding that the Court should protect Chrestensen's acts
because his handbills contained matters of public interest and were not
solely commercial. 4 1 Finding that Chrestensen's distribution was an undesir-
able invasion of, or interference with, the public's full enjoyment of the
streets, the Court held that the state legislative body had a right to enact
legislation prohibiting the distribution of commercial material on the street.42
Thus, the Court denied any First Amendment protection to commercial
speech.
43
Gradually, the Court began to indicate that commercial speech was
entitled to some First Amendment protection. 44 The Supreme Court extended
First Amendment protection to commercial speech for the first time in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council45
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court considered whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited the states from restricting price disclosures in
advertising by pharmacists. 46 The Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (Con-
sumer Council) challenged the Virginia Board of Pharmacy's (Board) ruling
that licensed pharmacists were not permitted to advertise the prices of
prescription drugs.47 The Board argued that such advertising was unprofes-
sional.48 The Consumer Council challenged the Board's ruling on the ground
that restrictions on advertising violated the First Amendment, which protects
free speech.49 The Court held that the First Amendment protects commercial
38. Id.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 54-55.
43. Id. at 55.
44. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (holding that speech is not stripped
of First Amendment protection simply because speech is commercial in nature); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (upholding
city ordinance prohibiting certain newspaper advertisements only because advertisements dis-
criminated on basis of sex).
45. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court in Virginia Pharmacy for the first time clearly
enunciated the commercial speech doctrine, which extends limited First Amendment protection
to commercial speech. Id. at 761-62.
46. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 749-50 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 752.
49. Id. at 754.
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speech to the extent that such speech provides consumers with information
necessary to make informed purchasing decisions. 0
The Supreme Court had rejected in previous cases the reasoning that
the First Amendment did not extend to commercial speech simply because
the advertiser's interest was purely economic.51 However, the Virginia Phar-
macy Court maintained that while the state has a valid interest in promul-
gating rules to regulate professional conduct, the First Amendment interest
regarding the free flow of information outweighs the states' interests in
regulating conduct.52 The Court compared the issues presented in commercial
speech cases with the issues presented in labor dispute cases, 53 in which the
Court had granted heightened First Amendment protection to speech for
many years.5 4 According to the Court, commercial speech resembles speech
found in labor disputes in several ways. First, both types of speech are
economically motivated.5 5 Second, the aim of each is to inform the listener
about a product or idea.56 Third, the speaker in both situations tries to
influence the listener and is, therefore, persuasive in nature.5 7 Although
economic interests motivate contestants in labor disputes, the First Amend-
ment entitles both sides to speak about the merits of the dispute.5 8 The
Court has reasoned in labor dispute cases that the failure to give labor
dispute speech heightened protection would dampen the free discussion of
the issues involved in the dispute, or would allow management to use
defamation actions as weapons of economic coercion.
5
1
50. Id. at 762.
51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 770.
53. Id. at 762. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
reasoning in granting labor speech heightened protection); see also infra notes 145-151 and
accompanying text (explaining similarities between commercial speech and labor speech).
54. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text (discussing history of First Amendment
protection for labor dispute speech and Supreme Court's reasoning in granting labor speech
heightened protection).
55. See infra notes 145-146 and accompanying text (explaining economic nature of both
commercial speech and speech in labor disputes).
56. Compare Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (explaining that First Amendment protects expression on merits
of labor dispute); with id. at 764 (expressing idea that commercial speech may convey
information to society).
57. Compare Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (stating that First Amendment protects
labor dispute speech that is designed to influence outcome of debate) with Travers, Federal
Trade Commission Regulation of Deceptive Advertising-Foreword, 17 U. KAN. L. REv. 551,
556 (1969) (stating that advertising by nature is persuasive).
58. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
59. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277 (1974) (holding
that threat of liability for overenthusiastic use of rhetoric or innocent mistake of fact must
not stifle right to persuade employees to join labor union); see also Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64 (1966) (holding that in view of juries' propensity
to award excessive damages in defamation actions, libel actions might be used as weapons
against labor unions and smaller employers).
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Similarly, the Virginia Pharmacy Court reasoned that the failure to
grant heightened protection to commercial speech would have undesirable
effectsY° One essential element of the Court's decision in Virginia Pharmacy
is the reasoning that the First Amendment protects both a speaker's right
to convey information and a listener's right to receive information .6 The
Court reiterated its holding from numerous cases that citizens have a right
to receive information and that the First Amendment protects this right.
6 2
Correspondingly, the Court held that if a right to advertise exists, a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising also exists.63 The Court, conse-
quently, found compelling the argument that the suppression of prescription
drug price information most affected those people who have the greatest
need for the information to make an informed decision about their pur-
chases-namely, the elderly, the sick, and the poor. 64 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that denial of First Amendment protection to the conveyance of
this information simply because the advertiser had a purely economic interest
would result in a denial of information to a segment of the public with
substantial need for the information.
65
A second essential element in the Virginia Pharmacy decision is society's
general interest in the free flow of commercial information. 66 While recog-
nizing that not all advertisements supply essential information to the con-
sumer, the Supreme Court reasoned that society in general benefits if
information regarding the production, sale, and pricing of goods and services
is readily available, whether through the advertising media or another
source.67 The Court reasoned that the general public will make more educated
purchasing decisions if product information is not restricted. 6 Consequently,
the Court concluded that unrestricted access to information will properly
allocate resources, a crucial element of the free enterprise system.
69
Based onl this reasoning, the Virginia Pharmacy Court granted com-
mercial speech First Amendment protection to the extent that such adver-
tising provides consumers with information necessary to make informed
purchasing decisions. 70 Virginia Pharmacy does not grant any heightened
protection under traditional First Amendment analysis to advertising that is
60. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (describing undesirable effects of not
granting heightened protection to commercial speech).
61. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757.
62. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (holding that First Amendment
necessarily protects right to receive information); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
305-07 (1965) (holding that citizens have right to receive political publications sent from
abroad).
63. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757.
64. Id. at 763.
65. Id. at 763-64.
66. Id. at 764.
67. Id. at 764-65.
68. Id. at 765.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 763.
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false or misleading. 71 This rule for commercial speech is in contrast to
noncommercial speech cases, which require a showing of actual malice for
recovery.72 Accordingly, the Court concluded that while First Amendment
protection extends to commercial speech because the free flow of commercial
information is essential to the free market system, the states, nevertheless,
have every right to ensure that the information the advertisers disseminate
is truthful and legitimate. 73 Thus, the Supreme Court affords only a limited
First Amendment protection to commercial speech.
In recent years the Supreme Court has given various reasons for giving
only limited First Amendment protection to commercial speech. First, the
economic interest of the advertiser is the primary motive of commercial
speech. 74 In contrast, the First Amendment was designed to protect the free
exchange of ideas. Specifically, the First Amendnient was enacted to en-
courage political discussion about the nation's leadership. 75 Thus, the First
Amendment was not enacted to protect advertising.76 Second, because the
Court has characterized commercial speech as more durable than other
forms of speech, 77 regulation of commercial speech will not have a chilling
effect that would silence the speaker. 7 Third, because commercial advertisers
have the knowledge and ability to ensure the accuracy of the information
before the information is disseminated and, therefore, are in the best position
to verify the truthfulness of their speech, 79 the Court has insisted on literal
truth in commercial advertising. 0 Finally, the Court has expressed fears
that if it grants commercial and noncommercial speech equal protection,
the efficacy of the protection might unduly be diluted for noncommercial
speech."'
71. Id. at 771.
72. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (describing actual malice standard that
courts apply in cases involving noncommercial speech).
73. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
74. See id. at 762 (assuming that advertiser's interest is purely economic interest).
75. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (explaining that
drafters enacted First Amendment to protect speech that criticizes government).
76. See Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005,
1027-38 (1967) (explaining that drafters enacted First Amendment to protect ideas of governed
about those who govern). Because commercial speech is unrelated to the purpose of protecting
ideas of the governed, commercial speech does not deserve the same amount of protection.
Id.
77. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (holding that commercial speech may
be more durable than other kinds of speech, because it is less likely to be chilled by proper
regulation).
78. Id.
79. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
n.6 (1980) (holding that advertiser has ability and knowledge to verify accuracy of information).
80. Id.
81. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that requiring
parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech would invite
dilution of force of First Amendment's guarantee with respect to noncommercial speech).
While the majority of the Supreme Court developed the actual malice test for noncom-
1180
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In addition to the Court's refusal to extend heightened First Amendment
protection to commercial speech in general, the Court also has refused to
extend any form of heightened First Amendment protection to commercial
speech that involves matters of public interest.8 2 While noncommercial speech
mercial speech, at least one Supreme Court Justice supported total immunity for defamatory
comment. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 899 (Douglas, J., dissenting),
denying cert. to 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971). Justice Douglas expressed his view that the Court
should no longer allow defamation plaintiffs to seek relief in the court system. Id. at 899.
Douglas rejected the actual malice test of New York Times, stating that "even untrue remarks,"
including calculated falsehoods, "may have positive effects upon the quality of our re-
examination process." Id. at 903. The Court, according to Douglas, should not interfere with
the "rough-and-tumble" of debate, because this process may produce the closest approximation
of "factual truth or preferred opinion." Id. Therefore, Douglas concluded that the Court had
struck an improper balance in New York Times with the actual malice standard.
Additionally, Douglas was concerned about the "continuing readjustment of constitutional
doctrine" that the New York Times decision necessitated. Id. The Court continually must
clarify the circumstances in which it must apply the actual malice standard, resulting in an ad
hoc approach that, according to Douglas, has backed the Court into a "subjective quagmire."
Id. at 904. Douglas pointed out that between the New York Times decision and the Grove
case (1964-1971), the Court had to clarify the applicable circumstances of the actual malice
standard sixteen times. Id. at 903. The logical extension of this tightening of the actual malice
test, according to Douglas, is the complete elimination of libel and slander recoveries. Id. at
904.
More importantly, Justice Douglas did not limit his approval of total immunity only to
noncommercial speech. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Douglas wrote
a concurring opinion in which he succinctly stated his idea that the Court should grant
immunity to all speech:
[The First Amendment] has often been stressed as essential to the exposition and
exchange of political ideas, to the expression of philosophical attitudes, to the
flowering of the letters. Important as the First Amendment is to all those cultural
ends, it has not been restricted to them. Individual or group protests against action
which results in monetary injuries are certainly not beyond the reach of the First
Amendment, as Thornhill v. Alabama, ... which placed picketing within the ambit
of the First Amendment, teaches .... A protest against government action that
affects a business occupies as high a place. The profit motive should make no
difference, for that is an element inherent in the very conception of a press under
our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through exercise of First
Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy
or promotion is not hitched to a profit motive.
Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See generally Note, Eliminating Distinctions Between Commercial and Political Speech:
Replacing Regulation with Government Counterspeech, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1129 (1990)
(arguing that Court should eliminate distinctions between commercial and political speech and
grant full First Amendment protection because distinctions are based on faulty assumptions).
82. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985)
(holding that First Amendment protects commercial speech unless speech is false or misleading);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (restating that commercial
speech receives less protection than other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression);
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (holding that commercial speech receives limited protection commen-
surate with its subordinate position in scale of First Amendment values); see also Schmidt &
Burns, Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of Commercial Speech, 56
19911 1181
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of public concern receives the heightened protection of the actual malice
U. CIN. L. REv. 1273, 1283-1286 (1988) (discussing implications of Zauderer).
In Zauderer the Supreme Court considered whether Ohio's restraints on advertising by
attorneys violated the First Amendment. 471 U.S. at 629. There, the defendant Zauderer, an
attorney practicing in Ohio, first had run a small advertisement in a local newspaper stating
that Zauderer would represent clients in drunken driving cases on a contingent fee basis. Id.
at 629-30. After the plaintiff-the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio-had informed Zauderer that the advertisement violated the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility, Zauderer withdrew the advertisement. Id. at 630. A year later, Zauderer ran a
second ad, this time stating that he would represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield, an
intrauterine contraceptive device. Id. On this occasion, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed
charges against Zauderer on the grounds that both the first and second advertisements violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 631. The complaint alleged that the first
advertisement was false, fraudulent, misleading and deceptive, because the advertisement stated
that Zauderer would take cases on a contingent-fee basis in violation of Ohio Disciplinary
Rule 2-106(C). Id. The complaint alleged that the second advertisement violated Disciplinary
Rules requiring that advertisements by attorneys be dignified, prohibiting illustrations, prohib-
iting self-recommendation, and prohibiting employment obtained through unsolicited advice.
Id. at 632-33. The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Zauderer had violated the Disciplinary
Rules. Id. at 634-35. Zauderer appealed, claiming that the Disciplinary Rules violated the First
Amendment by prohibiting the right to advertise. Id. at 636.
The United States Supreme Court reiterated the holding of previous commercial speech
cases that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, although less
than that given to noncommercial speech. Id. at 637. The Court also stated that the states are
free to prevent the dissemination of false and misleading commercial speech. Id. at 638. The
Court held, however, that the government can restrict speech which is not false or deceptive
only in the service of a substantial government interest, and only through means that directly
advance that interest. Id. The Court also stated that while some people may have found
Zauderer's advertisments distasteful, the advertisments in no way invaded the privacy of those
who read the advertisements, and so did not fall under the reasoning found in Ohralik. Id.
at 642. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-66 (upholding ban on in-person solicitation by attorney
due to possible undue influence; state interest in preventing fraud outweighed First Amendment
considerations).
The Zauderer Court also rejected the state's argument in favor of the advertising
restrictions because the Court feared that it then would have little basis for preventing
governments from suppressing other forms of truthful and nondeceptive advertising simply to
spare the state from having to distinguish truthful advertising from false or deceptive adver-
tising. 471 U.S. at 646. The Court stated that the First Amendment would not retain its
protective force if the ban were upheld. Id. Finally, the Court explained that the free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing the costs of discerning truthful
from deceptive advertising on regulators. Id.
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that Ohio's ban on advertising by attorneys
violated the First Amendment. Id. The Court refused to apply prophylactic restraints on
commercial advertising. Id. at 646-47. However, the Court did uphold Ohio's disclosure
requirements and affirmed Zauderer's public reprimand for those advertisements that were
deceptive regarding contingent fees. Id. at 651, 655.
Schmidt & Burns argue that Zauderer suggests at least two qualifications to the rule that
false advertising and misleading commercial speech are entirely outside the protection of the
First Amendment. Schmidt & Burns, supra, at 1283. First, the Zauderer Court suggested that
a disclosure requirement, required in an attempt to counteract false and deceptive implications,
might offend the First Amendment by being overly burdensome. Id. Second, the Court
suggested that where an implied misrepresentation is not "self-evident," Zauderer, 471 U.S.
at 652-53, the regulating body may bear the burden of proving the consumer's perception of
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standard,8 3 the Court has refused to extend the actual malice standard to
commercial speech.8 4 On the other hand, a company commenting on public
issues outside the commercial advertising arena receives heightened protec-
tion, but does not receive heightened protection when commenting in a
commercial context. 5 The Supreme Court has reasoned that virtually all
advertisers could link their product to some issue of public concern and,
thus, limiting heightened protection only to commercial speech involving
public issues would not be an effective screening method.16 The Court has
drawn a distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial speech,
placing greater importance on regulating commercial speech that advertisers
disseminate to consumers than on a company's right to comment on issues
of public concern within a commercial context.
7
The commercial speech doctrine, however, does not influence Court
decisions under the law of defamation. The commercial speech doctrine and
the rules regarding defamation have developed independently of each other
and have countervailing interests. 8 Until recently, the courts have not faced
a case involving both doctrines and, therefore, have not had to balance the
competing interests of commercial speech and defamation. The Court has
not faced such a case because the traditional vehicle for relief between
competitors in the commercial speech area is an action for product dispar-
agement 89 Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
the advertisement. Schmidt & Burns, supra, at 1283.
Schmidt & Burns also note that the Court should apply a higher standard of review in
determining whether speech in a particular context is unprotected. Id. at 1286. The authors
state that the Supreme Court also has suggested that it should adopt this view. Id. In Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court listed
five types of unprotected expression, including libelous speech, fighting words, incitement to
riot, obscenity, and child pornography, and stated that the Court had regularly conducted an
independent review of the record in each case to determine with certainty that the speech in
question fell outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 504-05. The Court also
stated that it had defined the limits of unprotected speech narrowly to ensure that protected
expression will not be inhibited. Id.
83. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (defining heightened protection of
actual malice standard).
84. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (holding that protection given to commercial speech
is less extensive than that afforded noncommercial speech).
85. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
86. Id., (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563, n.5 (1980)).
87. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (explaining government's interest in
regulating commercial speech).
88. Compare supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (explaining fundamental right of
free exchange of ideas) with supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (explaining that Court
requires advertiser to ensure accuracy of information conveyed to consumer).
89. See Brannigan & Ensor, supra note 30, at 573 (explaining difference between product
disparagement and defamation). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 128 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining difference between product disparagement action and defa-
mation); Note, The First Amendment and the Basis of Liability in Actions for Corporate Libel
and Product Disparagement, 27 EMORY L.J. 755 (1978) (explaining action of product dispar-
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Third Circuit reviewed a district court decision on the issue of defamation
in the context of commercial speech. In U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia" the court considered whether allegedly defamatory
statements made in a comparative advertising campaign should receive the
heightened protection of the actual malice standard of the First Amend-
ment. 91
U.S. Healthcare arose out of a comparative advertising campaign be-
tween two health insurers, U.S. Healthcare, a health maintenance organi-
zation (HMO), 92 and Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross).93 Blue Cross
experienced a loss in profits during the mid-1980s, due in part to the
increased enrollment in HMOs generally, but in U.S. Healthcare specifi-
cally. 94 To compete with the HMOs, Blue Cross introduced a new product
called "Personal Choice," which provided customers with an established
network of health care providers. 95 Blue Cross' Personal Choice resembled
health plans that HMOs offered in that customers had to obtain permission
from a member of the network before seeking treatment outside the net-
work.
96
Blue Cross launched a deliberately aggressive advertising campaign to
introduce Personal Choice. 97 The campaign also sought to reduce the appeal
of HMOs. 98 Blue Cross' campaign consisted of eight print advertisements,
seven television advertisements, three radio advertisements, and a direct
mailing brochure. 99 Most of the advertisements simply compared the features
of the competing products.?° One of the television advertisements, however,
agement); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984) (balancing private rights of sellers against First Amendment in product disparagement
action).
Product disparagement is a tort action in which the plaintiff must prove that a false
statement concerning the nature or quality of its product was made by the defendant. Brannigan
& Ensor, supra note 30, at 572-73. Product disparagement relates to false or misleading
criticism of a specific product, in contrast to defamation, which is an action relating to the
character of the corporation. Id. at 573.
90. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct. 58 (1990).
91. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 927 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
92. Id. at 917. A health maintenance organization, or HMO, acts as both an insurer
and a provider of services that are more comprehensive than those offered by traditional
insurance policies. Id. HMO subscribers choose a primary health care provider from the HMO
network. Id. The subscriber then works through the network to determine when the susbscriber
requires treatment from a specialist. Id. Usually, the policy does not cover treatment by a
specialist that the subscriber obtains without the network's permission. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. U.S. Healthcare was the largest HMO in the Delaware Valley by 1986, claiming
almost 600,000 members. Id.





100. Id. All eight of Blue Cross' print advertisements compared the various features of
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was a dramatic portrayal of a grief-stricken woman, suggesting that she had
experienced a great tragedy because of her choice of health care.' 0'
In response to Blue Cross' advertising campaign, U.S. Healthcare sued
Blue Cross for product disparagement,'02 defamation, and tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations. 03 Later, U.S. Healthcare added a Lanham
Act claim."° 4 U.S. Healthcare then began its own aggressive comparative
advertising campaign. 05
Blue Cross and U.S. Healthcare. Id. Seven of the eight print advertisements specifically stated
that U.S. Healthcare required its subscribers to obtain permission from a U.S. Healthcare
physician for an examination by a specialist. Id. The eighth print advertisement stated that
Personal Choice did not require permission by its physicians for an examination by a specialist.
Id. Three of the eight print advertisements and the print brochure implied that referrals to
specialists take away money from U.S. Healthcare physicians. Id. Four of the seven television
advertisements referred to HMOs only in the closing slogan, claiming that Personal Choice
was better than U.S. Healthcare. Id. The fifth television advertisement presented an HMO
subscriber who stated that he resented having to ask his HMO doctor for permission to consult
a specialist. Id. The sixth advertisement featured a man saying that HMO plans give subscribers
no choice of doctors or hospitals. Id. at 918-19.
101. Id. at 919. The seventh Blue Cross television advertisement was a dramatic portrayal
of a grief-stricken woman who said, "The hospital my HMO sent me to just wasn't enough.
It's my fault." Id. During this final advertisement, solemn music played. Id. The advertisement
implied that a tragedy befell the woman because she subscribed to an HMO. Id.
102. See supra note 89 (defining product disparagement action).
103. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 919.
104. Id. at 920. See generally Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study
of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1 (1985)
(declaring Lanham Act to be one method of correcting false advertising); Donegan, Section
43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act as a Private Remedy for False Advertising, 37 FoOD
DRU G CosM. L.J. 264 (1982) (explaining use of Lanham Act claims in false advertising context).
The Lanham Act states in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols
tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or
services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the
falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure
the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier
to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which
said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (amended 1988). The Lanham Act
prohibits false and misleading representations in connection with the promotion of goods or
services. Donegan, supra, at 264. Congress's original incentive to enact the statute was to
provide adequate protection against unfair competition that certain international treaties
required the United States to provide. Id. at 271. However, the drafters also recognized the
need to protect property rights of commercial interests. Id. Nonetheless, the first courts to
apply the Act did so narrowly, using the Act as a bar against trademark infringements rather
than against false and misleading advertisements. Id. at 272. The Third Circuit expanded the
interpretation of the Act, however, in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d
649 (3d Cir. 1954). The L'Aiglon court rejected the idea that the Act was merely a codification
of the common-law rule protecting only trademark infringement. Id. at 651. While post-
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On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether the district court had
erred by denying U.S. Healthcare's defamation claim and granting height-
ened protection to Blue Cross' advertisements. 106 U.S. Healthcare argued
that the court should not have applied the actual malice standard because
the basis of the claims was false commercial speechY°7 On the other hand,
Blue Cross argued that the court should grant heightened First Amendment
protection because the Blue Cross commercials had done more than merely
propose a commercial transaction and were at the center of a public debate,
thus, making U.S. Healthcare a limited purpose public figure. 08
L'Aiglon courts accepted the expanded interpretation of the Lanham Act slowly, by the late
1970's the Act had become a powerful remedy for false and misleading advertising. Donegan,
supra, at 273. Today, several factors limit the application of the Lanham Act, including the
cost of litigation compared to the unlikelihood of a full trial, litigants' preference for
preliminary relief, and the courts' recent narrowing of standing only to business plaintiffs.
Best, supra, at 24.
105. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 919. The U.S. Healthcare campaign featured five print
advertisements, four television advertisements, and two radio advertisements. Id. at 919. Some
of U.S. Healthcare's advertisements attempted to directly contradict the implications made by
the Blue Cross campaign. Id. The first of U.S. Healthcare's advertisements emphasized the
length to which U.S. Healthcare will go to provide top medical treatment and featured a
healthy little girl who was a former HMO patient. Id. The advertisement claimed that the
HMO sent the girl to the best surgeon in the country for her operation. Id. The second group
of advertisements featured a physician explaining that the purpose of a primary care physician
is to decide what type of specialist the subscriber should consult, so that the subscriber receives
the best treatment. Id.
The final group of advertisements was clearly "anti-Blue Cross," comparing the features
of the competing products and further suggesting that Blue Cross was not representing its
product accurately. Id. U.S. Healthcare's final television advertisement was U.S. Healthcare's
response to Blue Cross' dramatic commercial. Id. at 920. The advertisement showed grieving
family members standing around a hospital bed as someone pulled a sheet over a Personal
Choice brochure. Id.
106. Id. During U.S. Healthcare's responsive campaign, Blue Cross filed counterclaims
to U.S. Healthcare's lawsuit against Blue Cross. Id. Prior to trial, U.S. Healthcare added a
Lanham Act claim, see supra note 104 (defining Lanham Act), alleging that Blue Cross had
made a factual misrepresentation regarding U.S. Healthcare's insurance package. Id. U.S.
Healthcare removed the case to federal court based on the assertion of a federal question and
the court exercised pendant jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. The trial lasted fourteen
days. Id. After eight days of deliberations, the jury announced that it was deadlocked on all
issues of liability and damages. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania declared a mistrial; then, finding virtual unanimity on the counterclaim issues,
sent the jury back to decide the issue of Blue Cross' counterclaims. Id. The jury returned a
verdict against Blue Cross. Id. The district court then entered judgment for U.S. Healthcare
and scheduled a new trial for U.S. Healthcare's own claims. Id. Prior to the second trial,
Blue Cross filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the advertisements
should receive heightened First Amendment protection and that U.S. Healthcare had not met
the actual malice standard of proof. Id. In granting the motion and setting ground-breaking
precedent, the district court held that, because the parties involved were public figures and
because the advertisements involved issues of public concern, the advertisements received the
heightened First Amendment protection of the actual malice standard. Id.
107. Id. at 927.
108. Id. at 935-36.
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The Third Circuit relied on both established defamation and commercial
speech law in reversing the district court's decision and holding that Blue
Cross was liable for defamation.' 9 Relying heavily on the principles estab-
lished in Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny,"0 the Court reiterated the rule
that the First Amendment entitles commercial speech to limited protection,
but that the traditional interests of the First Amendment in defamation
actions are less significant in the commercial speech context."' Specifically,
the court relied on the reasoning of Virginia Pharmacy that economic
factors motivate commercial speech, that regulation will not chill commercial
speech as easily as other types of speech, and that the conveyors of
commercial speech may verify more easily the veracity of the information
they convey."1
2
The U.S. Healthcare court found that the advertisements in question
possessed all the characteristics set forth in the Supreme Court decisions
regarding commercial speech; namely, the advertisements were part of a
professionally run promotional campaign, the advertisements specifically
refer to a product, and the desire for revenue motivated the speech."13 The
court stated that it placed great importance on the durability of the speech
in question; because commercial speech does not chill easily, the speech
does not require the heightened protection of the actual malice standard." 4
In U.S. Healthcare the court stated that the health care market, because of
its size, adequately would prevent any chilling effect that only limited First
Amendment protection otherwise might cause." ' Because the health care
market in the region that Blue Cross and U.S. Healthcare cover generates
hundreds of millions of dollars in insurance premiums, the insurers have a
substantial incentive to advertise heavily to garner this business." 6 Conse-
quently, the court stated that limits on the insurers' advertisements would
not stifle the insurers' voices."
7
Additionally, the court found that the companies easily could verify the
information that they released, because the facts contained in the advertise-
ments were well within the scope of the companies' knowledge." 8 The court
further found that the dramatic, scare-tactic advertisements, which were
capable of defamatory meaning, added little information to the market-
place."9 To the extent that these statements were false, the court reasoned
109. Id. at 928.
110. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (outlining Court's reason for granting
only limited protection to commercial speech).
111. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933-34.
112. Id. at 934-35.
113. Id. at 934.
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that the speech had no constitutional value and, therefore, should not
receive full First Amendment protection.
120
The U.S. Healthcare court also rejected Blue Cross' argument that
health care is an issue of public concern and that the court, therefore,
should grant the traditional heightened protection standard that it applies
in defamation cases to these advertisements.' 2 ' The court refused to extend
defamation heightened protection to advertisements involving matters of
public concern because of the fear that this extension would lead to the
protection of virtually all advertising.' 22 This broad protection, according to
the court, would blur the distinctions that the Supreme Court established
between commercial and noncommercial speech. 23 The court sought to
avoid this outcome, fearing that a blur in the distinctions would reduce the
efficacy of First Amendment protection in noncommercial settings.'
24
Finally, the Third Circuit in U.S. Healthcare refused to classify either
U.S. Healthcare or Blue Cross as public figures under the traditional
defamation analysis.2 5 The court conceded that both U.S. Healthcare and
Blue Cross would qualify as limited purpose public figures, because both
parties have tremendous access to the media and because the risk of
defamation arose because each party sought to influence consumer choices.
26
As evidence of the companies' access to the media, the court cited the
massive advertising campaigns that each side launched. 127 The court also
looked at each party's attempt to use dramatic comparative advertising to
establish itself as the best health care provider and, thereby, influence the
consumer's decision.
28
120. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980)).
121. Id. at 935 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
122. Id. at 936 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562, n.5).
123. Id. at 936 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, n.5).
124. Id. at 936.
125. Id. at 939; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (defining
public figure plaintiffs in traditional defamation analysis). Three classes of public figures exist:
those who are public figures in all contexts, those who involuntarily are made public figures,
and those individuals who are public figures solely for the purpose of a particular dispute. Id.
The Court in Gertz defined the first group as those who have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society; these individuals occupy positions of very persuasive
power and influence. Id. The second group is composed of those individuals who become
public figures involuntarily and have taken no purposeful action of their own; this group is
extremely rare. Id. The final group is composed of those individuals who are limited purpose
public figures, and have thrust themselves to the forefront of a particular controversy to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. Id.
Generally, two factors determine whether a person is a limited purpose public figure.
U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938. The first factor is the party's relative access to the media;
the greater the party's access, the more likely the Court will be to consider the party a public
figure. Id. The second factor is the manner in which the risk of defamation arose; if the risk
arose because the party deliberately thrust itself into controversy, the Court likely will consider
the party a public figure. Id.
126. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Brannigan & Ensor, supra note 30, at 591 (arguing that any vendor of
commercial product is public figure).
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Therefore, the court stated that the companies' access to the media and
the situation surrounding the defamation suits strongly suggested that the
parties were limited purpose public figures. 129 However, the court declined
to label the parties as limited purpose public figures. 30 The court reasoned
that Blue Cross and U.S. Healthcare became public figures only because of
a comparative advertising war and because their motive was to generate
revenue rather than influence the resolution of a public issue.' 3' The Third
Circuit concluded that classifying commercial advertisers as limited purpose
public figures and granting advertisers heightened protection because of this
classification would shield all future advertisers behind the actual malice
standard. 132
Based on this reasoning, the court held that the heightened protection
of the actual malice standard did not extend to the advertisements in
question. 33 Consequently, the result of the Third Circuit's decision in U.S.
Healthcare is that in defamation actions brought in the Third Circuit,
commercial speech in the comparative advertising context will not receive
the heightened protection of the actual malice standard that the courts apply
in traditional defamation actions. 34 Under the limited First Amendment
protection analysis, a company will need to prove only that the competitor
made a statement that was potentially harmful. 3 The plaintiff company
will not have to prove the falsity of the statement, or that the competitor
made the statement with actual malice. 36 Therefore, this leaves companies
vulnerable to a flood of lawsuits challenging their advertisements.
The Third Circuit heavily relied on the commercial speech doctrine in
denying heightened First Amendment protection to statements made in the
course of a comparative advertising campaign. 13 7 While the court's analysis
is sound, the court apparently did not take into consideration the special
circumstances surrounding a comparative advertising campaign in contrast
to traditional commercial advertising. 3  First, and most importantly, com-
129. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938.




134. Id. Another logical outcome of the U.S. Healthcare decision is that companies will
attack their competitors by bringing defamation actions rather than the traditional product
disparagement action. Defamation actions usually result in larger damage awards than do
product disparagement actions; therefore, when a company can prove that a competitor made
a false statement which potentially harmed the suing company's reputation, the Court may
award both presumed and punitive damages. The decision greatly increases an advertiser's
potential liability for statements made in a comparative advertising campaign.
135. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. Healthcare court's
reliance on established commercial speech law).
138. See generally U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d 914 (failing to note any differences between
traditional commercial speech and comparative advertising). The U.S. Healthcare court failed
to make any distinctions between comparative advertising and traditional commercial speech.
Specifically, the court did not point out that comparative speech is two-sided in nature rather
than being focused on merely the advertiser's own product.
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parative advertising involves two competitors directly addressing a certain
product.'39 Traditional commercial advertising consists of one advertiser
making statements about its own product. 40 No competing party exists in
this setting to rebut the statement. Therefore, when statements made in the
course of traditional advertising are false, the courts must intervene to
correct the falsehood by not granting the speech full First Amendment
protection, or by awarding relief through a Lanham Act claim.' 4' The courts
in this way protect the consumer from false information. 42 In contrast to
traditional advertising, however, comparative advertising involves two com-
petitors that will rebut false statements that the other party makes in the
course of the campaign.' 43 The particular nature of a comparative advertising
campaign thus protects the consumer through the rebuttal process.'"4
The competitive nature of a comparative advertising campaign is very
similar to that involved in labor disputes, in which speech receives the
heightened protection of the actual malice standard. 45 First, economic
factors motivate both comparative advertising and labor disputes. 146 Sec-
ond, in both comparative advertising and labor disputes, the arguments
are two-sided. 47 The government need not intervene to protect the em-
ployees who hear the statements arising from the labor disputes, because
the opposing party is able to rebut any falsity made by the speaker. 4s
Finally, in both comparative advertising and labor disputes, the listener
expects the language to be persuasive; persuasion is the sine qua non
49 of
139. See generally Buchanan, Can You Pass the Comparative Ad Challenge?, H~Av. Bus.
REv., July-Aug. 1985, at 106 (describing comparative advertisement).
140. See Best, supra note 104, at 26 (defining conventional advertising as noncomparative).
141. See generally Travers, supra note 57 (discussing government's role in regulating
advertising).
142. See id. (discussing government 's protection of consumer from false statements by
advertisers).
143. See generally Buchanan, supra note 139, at 106 (describing options available to
comparative advertisers wishing to correct false representations concerning their products).
144. See Best, supra note 104, at 29 (discussing advertisers' preference of rebutting
comparative advertisements in nonlitigious manner). Best suggests that competitors may prefer
to counter comparative advertising with comparative advertisements of their own in order to
avoid prolonged and costly litigation. Id.
145. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (comparing commercial speech and
speech arising from labor disputes).
146. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (explaining that both commercial speech
and labor dispute speech are economically motivated).
147. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 938
(3d Cir) (stating that both comparative advertisers had access to media), cert. denied, 11l S.
Ct. 58 (1990).
148. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 271 (1973) (stating
that Court grants wide latitude to competing parties of labor controversies) (emphasis added);
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1965) (explaining National Labor
Relations Board policy of setting aside elections only when party has not had opportunity to
rebut).
149. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (stating that persuasion is sine qua non of commercial and
labor speech).
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both types of speech. 50 The average consumer likely will not believe
everything an advertiser says, just as the union worker will not believe all
the propaganda stemming from a labor dispute.
1 5'
The Supreme Court has adopted the view that union workers will not
believe all the propaganda stemming from a labor dispute.'5 2 In Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers'53 the Court granted heightened protection to
speech arising from labor disputes.'5 4 There, the Court considered whether
the actual malice standard should apply to speech made during a union
organizing campaign. 5 5 The plaintiff, a manager of a manufacturing plant,
filed suit against the union, two of its officers, and a plant employee after
the defendants made statements in a leaflet to the employees that the
plaintiff was a member of the management that robbed workers of any pay
increases and denied workers a vote. 5 6 The plaintiff claimed that the
statements were false, defamatory and untrue, and that the defendants knew
of the falsity.1 7 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the court
of appeals affirmed.1
5s
The plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim to the Supreme Court, where the Court first characterized speech in
labor disputes as being bitter, embellished, and vituperative, and which in
other circumstances might be actionable per se.'5 9 The Court relied on
previous National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions in finding that
language in labor disputes is not actionable per se in that specific context.'1
6
150. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N REAUTHORIZATION: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMUTTEE
ON COMMERCE, TRANSPORTATION AND TouRism OF Tm HOUSE CoMMrrHEE ON ENERGY AND
COMWMERCE, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1982) (stating that advertising is art form which must
motivate and persuade if it is to avoid being economic waste);
see also Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that
audience anticipates persuasive speech in certain contexts such as labor disputes), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Koch v. Goldway, 607 F. Supp. 223, 225 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding
that Court will consider language otherwise categorized as statement of fact as opinion when
used in public debate, heated labor dispute, or other setting in which audience may anticipate
efforts by parties to persuade), aff'd, 817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1987).
151. See supra note 150 (explaining that listener expects persuasive speech in certain
situations and is, therefore, likely to discount hyperbole and fiery rhetoric); see also Best,
supra note 104, at 9 (stating that almost half of all consumers do not believe truthfulness of
advertising claims). Best cites a study that appeared in ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 5, 1984, at 1,
col. 1, which reported that 47% of consumers do not believe that advertisers are truthful. Id.
The study also reported that although consumers in the higher income brackets responded
with more disbelief concerning the veracity of commercials, certain types of advertisements
such as comparative advertisements fail to deceive the majority of consumers. Id.
152. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966) (stating that union
workers will not believe everything that parties in labor dispute say).
153. 383 U.S. 53 (1965).
154. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
155. Id. at 57.
156. Id. at 56.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 57.
159. Id. at 58.
160. Id. at 60.
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Instead, the Court held that it would leave the appraisal of labor dispute
speech to the good sense of the voters and would leave the job of correcting
inaccurate and false statements to the opposing parties.' 6' The Court further
relied on NLRB decisions which stated that the NLRB would set aside
elections only when a party in the election misrepresented a material fact,
when opportunity for reply was lacking, and when the misrepresentation
had an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the
election. 162 The Court held that an action for libel would lie only when the
defendant acted with actual malice. 163 Because the Court found that the
defendant in the Linn case may have acted with actual malice, the case was
remanded for the jury to determine whether the defendant actually did act
with malice. 64
While the NLRB has altered its position regarding falsity of speech in
the labor setting in the past thirty years, currently the NLRB does not
regulate the falsity or truth of labor speech. 16 The NLRB's position is based
in part on findings that union workers are familiar with the tactics that the
parties in labor elections use, and that, therefore, the tactics are relatively
ineffective. 66 Because the workers expect the speech to be persuasive, the
workers do not believe everything that the participants say. 167 Also, the
opposing party in a labor dispute has ample opportunity and, indeed, is
expected to contradict any false statements that the party's opponent makes.'6
Because of the similarities between labor speech and comparative ad-
vertising speech, the courts would not be amiss in applying the labor dispute
analysis to comparative advertising speech. The consumer will expect com-
parative advertisements to be persuasive and will not believe that all state-
ments are true. 69 Also, the competitor company will have ample opportunity
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 64-65.
164. Id. at 66.
165. See generally Midland National Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982) (returning to
unregulated speech in labor elections). Originially, the NLRB prohibited misrepresentations in
labor speech. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). After 15 years, the NLRB
overruled the holding of Hollywood Ceramics and banned restrictions on labor speech, holding
that the workers were capable of recognizing and discounting campaign propaganda. Shopping
Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1977). The Board then returned to the stricter
regulation of Hollywood Ceramics after only 20 months. General Knit of California, Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). Currently the NLRB is operating under the less strict rule of Shopping
Kart, again recognizing that workers are properly able to weigh and discount campaign
propoganda. Midland National Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
166. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (explaining that workers expect
speakers to use language filled with rhetoric and hyperbole).
167. Id.
168. See N.L.R.B. v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir.
1962) (explaining that labor election will only be set aside in cases where party has not had
opportunity to rebut falsehoods).
169. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 150 (stating that
advertising is persuasive in nature); Travers, supra note 57, at 556 (stating that advertisements
are and will continue to be persuasive).
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to refute any false claims that the competing company makes. 7 0 Therefore,
the similarities should warrant similar treatment.
Furthermore, comparative advertising not only resembles competing
speech in the labor context, but also resembles competing speech in the
political context, particularly political debates.' 7' Although economic factors
alone do not motivate political candidates, self-interest and the desire to
defeat a competitor do motivate candidates. 7 2 The Court has long held that
the free exchange of ideas regarding the government is at the heart of the
First Amendment. 73 The Court protects any falsehood generated in political
debates in order to protect the true statements. 74 The Court also relies on
the ability of each party to correct inaccuracies reported by the opponent
and further relies on the common knowledge of the audience that candidates
design political speech to be persuasive. 75 Consequently, the Court grants
political debate the heightened protection of the actual malice standard.
76
Comparative advertising resembles political speech in two respects. First,
both comparative advertising and political speech are economically moti-
vated. Second, in both comparative advertising and political debates, the
parties have access to the intended audience, and equal opportunity to
correct false statements.
77
' Accordingly, the courts should apply similar reasoning when deciding
a case involving comparative advertising. Specifically, the courts should
apply the following three-pronged test to determine whether the context of
commercial speech permits the court to extend heightened protection to that
speech. 7 First, the court should determine that the parties involved in the
170. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 938
(3d Cir.) (stating that both comparative advertisers had access to media), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 58 (1990).
171. See infra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining similarities between commercial
speech and political speech).
172. See Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir.) (stating that political candidates
engage in vehement, caustic, and unpleasant attacks to obtain office), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
324 (1989).
173. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (stating that by enacting First Amend-
ment framers intended to protect speech by governed about governing).
174. See Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1377 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(holding that erroneous statement of fact is inevitable in free debate, and Court must protect
it to ensure free exchange of ideas), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (same).
175. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text (explaining that listeners in certain
circumstances expect speech to be persuasive and, therefore, do not believe speech as readily).
176. See Pestrak, 670 F. Supp. at 1375 (holding that plaintiff must prove actual malice
to recover in political debate case).
177. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (stating that public official
has greater access to channels of communication sufficiently to rebut falsehoods).
178. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (describing proposed three-pronged
test to apply to comparative advertising).
Alternatively, the courts could extend not only heightened protection to comparative
advertising speech, but could grant this type of speech full immunity from any defamation
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litigation have equal access to the media. 79 This prong is essential to the
test, because without equal access, the plaintiff cannot effectively rebut any
false statement. 80 Without the opportunity to rebut, the exchange is not
two-sided, and the government or court should intervene to prevent an
inequitable result.' 8' In fact, in both labor disputes and political debates,
claims. While the actual malice standard would afford comparative advertising speech greater
protection than this speech currently receives, the actual malice standard still would encourage
companies to file defamation actions claiming that the competing company acted with knowl-
edge that the advertisement was false or with reckless disregard of whether the ad was false.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 927 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
In the limited situation of comparative advertising, a rebuttal by the injured company
may be more beneficial than a defamation action, both to the injured company and to society
at large. Even if successful, the defamation plaintiff will recover long after the alleged
defamatory statement appeared in the media, and long after consumers heard the false
statement. Conversely, if the plaintiff company quickly rebuts any misinformation that the
competitor conveyed, consumers will be less likely to believe the false statement. Best, supra
note 102, at 9. Additionally, the plaintiff company could include its rebuttal in an existing
advertising campaign, which would be less expensive than litigating a defamation suit. Id. at
29. Furthermore, consumers will benefit by receiving a greater amount of information on
which to base their purchasing decisions. The existing commercial speech doctrine recognizes
as one of its goals the conveyance of information to the purchasing public. Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
The situation in U.S. Healthcare illustrates the above proposition. When Blue Cross
launched its advertising campaign featuring "anti-U.S. Healthcare" commercials, U.S. Health-
care immediately rebutted the allegations made in Blue Cross' campaign. U.S. Healthcare, 898
F.2d at 919. Consumers received information about both companies' products within a short
period of time. The likely effect of this campaign was to make consumers look more carefully
at what each insurer truly was offering. The ensuing defamation action did not benefit the
consumer in any way, whereas the debate between the two insurers resulted in a greater release
of information to the consuming public on which the public could base its purchasing decisions.
By granting to comparative advertising speech full immunity, above the existing actual malice
standard, the courts would preclude defamation actions that will burden an already overloaded
court system. The U.S. Healthcare case also demonstrated that even if one company institutes
a defamation action, that company nevertheless will rebut any misinformation conveyed by
the competitor to prevent the public from believing the false information. If a company is
going to engage in comparative advertising, the company should not be able to seek additional
redress in the court system.
179. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (holding that public
figures have less need for protection from defamatory statements); see also supra notes 20-23
and accompanying text (explaining that speech involving public figures receives greater First
Amendment protection because public figures have easy access to media); supra *notes 148,
175, & 177 and accompanying text (explaining that in comparative advertising, labor disputes,
and political debates, parties have ability to rebut falsehoods). As long as the parties have
equal access, they likely will rebut falsehood that the competitor makes. Pestrak v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
180. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (stating that parties without access to media cannot rebut
falsehoods and, therefore, deserve greater protection); see also supra notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text (explaining that private figure plaintiffs do not have easy access to media and,
therefore, cannot rebut easily falsehoods that defendant makes).
181. See Gertz, 418 at 345-48 (holding that plaintiffs without opportunity to rebut require
governmental protection); see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (describing
government regulation and court intervention in cases involving private figure plaintiffs).
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the Supreme Court has relied on the ability of both parties to access the
audience and rebut any inaccuracies in granting heightened First Amendment
protection.
82
Second, the court should determine that the advertiser directed the
advertisements at specific products that the competitor offers."3 While the
competitors may compare the various features of one another's products,
the court should not allow the competitors to make defamatory remarks
about the company itself, its management, or its employees, even if in a
comparative advertising setting.8 4 These statements would not serve any
purpose, as they would not promote thoughtful analysis on the part ofethe
consumer, or add any product information to the marketplace.'
Finally, the court should apply this test only to statements made in a
commercial setting. 8 6 Companies already receive the protection of the actual
malice standard for statements made outside the commercial context. 87
182. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (explaining that parties with access to media have greater
ability to rebut falsehoods); see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing
parties' access to media and consequent ability to rebut).
183. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for second prong
of test). The very nature of a comparative advertising campaign allows the companies involved
in the comparative advertising campaign to rebut any misinformation conveyed about their
products by giving the consumer the correct information. The companies would have greater
difficulty rebutting misinformation regarding the company in general.
184. See supra note 183 & infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (explaining require-
ment of directing advertisement at specific product and consequent availability of Lanham Act
claim).
185. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (rejecting protection for false or misleading advertisement that adds
no information to marketplace); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia,
898 F.2d 914, 935 (3d Cir.) (rejecting certain ads having no informational value), cert. denied,
S11 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
186. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that companies already receive
heightened protection outside the commercial arena).
187. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (stating that
companies have full protection for direct comments on public issues); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (holding that heightened
protection not necessary for corporations' statements on public issues in commercial context
because corporations have full protection when making statements in noncommercial setting);
see also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (restating that Court grants full protection
to company's speech outside commercial context).
Applying this test to the comparative advertising situation presented in U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
58 (1990), the two insurers involved in the advertising campaign clearly would meet the
qualifications of the test. First, both U.S. Healthcare and Blue Cross have equal access to the
media. U.S. Healthcare spent approximately $1.255 million on its advertising campaign, and
Blue Cross spent approximately $2.175 million on its campaign. Id. at 919. Secondly, the two
insurers directed their campaigns at specific products that the competitor offered. Id. at 918-
920. Although each company claimed that the advertisements in question negatively portrayed
the actual company rather than the company's products, id. at 925-26, this was not true. The
advertisements inferred that the products that the competitor offered, not the companies or
those who ran them, caused some tragedy to befall the subscriber. Finally, the advertisments
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Therefore, the court need not apply this test if the speech is made in a
noncommercial context.
Several results flow from the application of this test.188 First, the test
will limit commercial, noncomparative advertisers to traditional product
disparagement actions rather than defamation actions when the advertisers
meet the proposed test. 89 The damage awards are less in product dispar-
agement actions, but these awards generally have been adequate remedies. 19°
By not granting heightened protection to comparative advertising, the courts
risk an increase in litigation because companies are more likely to bring an
action if the potential awards are higher.' 9'
Another consequence of the proposed test's application is that consumers
will receive more information regarding competitors' products. 92 Although
some false information may escape regulation, the court will not filter out
any true information in an attempt to avoid falsehood.' 93 The exchange of
free ideas outweighs the danger of falsehood entering the market place.
94
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the inevitability of the dissemi-
nation of some falsehood since the earliest cases addressing First Amendment
protection in defamation actions. 19
Furthermore, the government does not lose its ability to regulate the
commercial arena by applying the proposed test.' 96 For example, the Lanham
were made in a clearly commercial setting, and were not part of any noncommercial statement
by either insurer. Id. at 918-19. Consequently, the advertisements by U.S. Healthcare and Blue
Cross would qualify for heightened immunity under the proposed test.
188. See supra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (describing three-pronged test).
189. See supra note 89 (explaining that product disparagement action is traditional remedy
for false statements regarding company's product).
190. See id. (describing remedies allowed in product disparagement actions).
191. See id. (stating that defamation awards generally are higher than awards from
product disparagement actions). A logical consequence of higher awards in defamation actions
is that advertisers would file defamation suits rather than product disparagement actions to
receive greater monetary relief.
192. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (stating that public had right to
information in advertisement that provided referral services for legal abortions); Chicago Joint
Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) (stating that consumers had right
to information in advertisement that promoted product as alternative to imports that put
American laborers out of work), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Fur Information & Fashion
Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (explaining that
consumers should know that manufacturer of artificial furs provided alternative to extinction
of fur-bearing mammals by competitors), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1022 (1974); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (explaining that reduced
restrictions on commercial speech result in greater flow of information to consumers).
193. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (describing Court's willingness to allow
some falsehood to protect free exchange of ideas).
194. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (stating Court's reasoning that First
Amendment protection of free speech outweighs dangers that falsehoods pose).
195. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (explaining that while
some falsehoods inevitably escape by protecting free debate, goal of protecting free debate
outweighs dangers that falsehoods pose).
196. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (explaining options available to
government in regulating commercial speech).
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Act will remain a force in controlling deceptive advertising. 197 The Lanham
Act prohibits express and implied false representations made in connection
with the sale of goods and services. 198 In the event that the parties in a
comparative advertising campaign do not qualify for immunity under the
proposed test and are deceiving the public, the Lanham Act would serve as
a safety net to prevent continued deception. 99
Traditionally, the Supreme Court, in deciding defamation cases, has
granted heightened First Amendment protection to allegedly defamatory
statements when the plaintiff is a public figure7O° and when the speech
involves a matter of public concern.201 Conversely, the Court had refused
to extend any heightened protection to commercial speech. 20 2 The Court has
distinguished commercial speech from other types of speech that have
traditionally received heightened protection such as speech arising out of
political debates 3 or labor debates204 and has held that because of these
distinguishing characteristics, commercial speech should not receive height-
ened First Amendment protection. 205 However, given the similarities between
comparative advertising speech, labor debate speech, and political debate
speech, the three types of speech warrant similar treatment.
Accordingly, comparative advertising is a unique form of commercial
speech in which the traditional commercial speech doctrine should not
apply.3 Instead, the courts should adopt the proposed three-pronged test,
207
and if the speech meets the criteria of the test, the court should grant the
speech heightened protection in defamation actions.208 By protecting the
speech, the courts will ensure that the consumer receives the maximum
amount of information regarding a product. 209 The courts will also avoid
197. See supra note 104 (describing history and usage of Lanham Act to control deceptive
advertising).
198. Id.
199. See supra note 104 (describing availability of Lanham Act to protect public from
deceptive advertising).
200. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing public figure plaintiff
analysis).
201. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing issues of public concern).
202. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (outlining commercial speech doctrine
of limited First Amendment protection).
203. See supra notes 171-176 and accompanying text (explaining First Amendment pro-
tection for political debate speech).
204. See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text (explaining First Amendment pro-
tection for labor dispute speech).
205. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (outlining distinctions between com-
mercial speech and other forms of traditionally protected speech).
206. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text (explaining unique nature of com-
parative advertising).
207. See supra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (proposing three-pronged test for
comparative advertising).
208. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (stating that speech meeting proposed test
is granted heightened First Amendment protection).
209. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text (explaining that three-pronged test
will result in more information in marketplace).
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time-consuming, costly defamation actions,210 and instead will have to




210. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text (explaining that proposed three-
pronged test will prevent undue burden on Court that could result from increased number of
defamation actions).
211. See supra notes 196-199 and accompanying text (discussing need for court to intervene
in other situations, but not in comparative advertising context).
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